INTRODUCTION
The period from 2017 to 2025 represents a significant phase in the evolution of Ecuador’s foreign policy. Following the end of the so‑called “Citizens’ Revolution”, Ecuador experienced several shifts in its external orientation. The administrations of Lenín Moreno (2017–2021), Guillermo Lasso (2021–2023) and Daniel Noboa (2023–2025) each faced a rapidly changing regional and global environment. Among the most pressing challenges was the rise of transnational organised crime, which gradually transformed Ecuador from a relatively peaceful country into one of the most violent in Latin America in terms of homicide rates.
The objective of this article is to examine how security considerations have influenced Ecuador’s foreign policy decisions in the given period. The central research question asks: what patterns of adaptation can be identified in Ecuador’s external security strategy, and how can these patterns be explained through existing theories of small state behaviour?
The relevance of the topic stems from the need to understand how medium‑sized and small states respond to non‑traditional security threats that transcend national borders. Ecuador’s experience is particularly instructive because it combines geographic vulnerability (location between the world’s main cocaine‑producing countries), economic dollarisation, and a complex migration situation. Moreover, the country’s active participation in international organisations – including a non‑permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2023–2024 – offers a valuable case study of the opportunities and constraints faced by smaller powers in multilateral settings.
OBJECTS AND METHODS OF RESEARCH
The object of this study is Ecuador’s foreign policy in the context of national and transnational security challenges. The subject comprises the specific mechanisms through which security threats have shaped bilateral and multilateral relations, including treaties, inter‑agency cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives.
Methodologically, the research relies on qualitative case study analysis. The theoretical framework combines two complementary approaches. First, small state theory (Waltz, 1979; Kovalev, 2024) distinguishes three ideal‑type strategies: balancing (forming coalitions to counter a stronger power), bandwagoning (aligning with a dominant power), and hedging (maintaining flexible relations with multiple centres of power). Second, the securitisation approach developed by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998) explains how certain issues are framed as existential threats, thereby legitimising extraordinary measures and reshaping foreign policy priorities.
The empirical basis of the research includes official documents: Ecuadorian executive decrees (notably Decreto Ejecutivo No. 111 of 9 January 2024, declaring an internal armed conflict), bilateral agreements (the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States of 6 October 2023), memoranda of understanding with the European Union, and statistical data from Ecuador’s Ministry of Interior and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Secondary sources comprise peer‑reviewed articles, reports by international think tanks, and diplomatic communiqués.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1. Evolution of Ecuador’s Foreign Policy Orientation (2017–2025)
The foreign policy of Ecuador after 2017 can be characterised as a gradual but consistent movement away from the ideologically charged “post‑neoliberal” orientation of the Correa years towards a more pragmatic and functionally differentiated approach.
Under President Lenín Moreno (2017–2021), Ecuador restored diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States, which had been strained after the 2009 closure of the Manta military base. However, Moreno did not abandon relations with China; on the contrary, economic ties with Beijing continued to grow. This pattern corresponds to a hedging strategy, wherein a small state avoids exclusive alignment and seeks to extract benefits from simultaneous engagement with competing powers (Landaburo & Garcia‑Sanz, 2024).
The Guillermo Lasso administration (2021–2023) deepened security cooperation with Washington. In October 2023, Ecuador signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States, which established legal conditions for the temporary presence of US military and civilian personnel on Ecuadorian territory for training and counter‑narcotics operations. Importantly, the agreement did not involve the permanent stationing of foreign troops. Lasso’s government also initiated a “Security Sector Assistance Roadmap” with the United States, focusing on intelligence sharing, port security, and police capacity building.
President Daniel Noboa (since November 2023) has presided over the most dramatic phase of Ecuador’s security crisis. On 9 January 2024, following a series of violent incidents including the escape of a major drug lord and hostage‑taking in a television studio, Noboa issued Decreto Ejecutivo No. 111, declaring an “internal armed conflict”. The decree classified 22 organised criminal groups as terrorist organisations and authorised the armed forces to conduct military operations against them. From the perspective of securitisation theory, this act transformed a problem of public safety into an existential threat to the state, thereby legitimising exceptional measures, including closer military cooperation with foreign partners.
At the same time, Noboa’s government has maintained a pragmatic stance towards China. In 2024, Ecuador ratified a free trade agreement with China, which had been negotiated under the previous administration. This means that while Ecuador moved closer to the United States on security matters, it did not sacrifice its economic relationship with China. Scholars have described this as pragmatic multi‑orientation or functional differentiation: a small state seeks security from one great power while pursuing trade and investment from another.
2. The Role of Transnational Threats in Shaping External Engagement
The primary driver of Ecuador’s foreign policy transformation has been the dramatic increase in violence linked to drug trafficking. According to data from Ecuador’s Ministry of Interior, the national homicide rate rose from approximately 5.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2017 to around 45 per 100,000 in 2023. The UNODC World Drug Report (2025) confirms that Ecuador has become a major transit corridor for cocaine produced in neighbouring Colombia and Peru, with seizures reaching record levels.
This internal deterioration has had direct external consequences. First, Ecuador intensified bilateral security cooperation with Colombia, including joint patrols along the 586‑km border and the exchange of real‑time intelligence on criminal group movements. In response to Ecuador’s crisis, Colombia offered military reinforcement on its side of the border – a gesture of regional solidarity.
Second, Ecuador participated in maritime security initiatives with Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama to combat drug trafficking on Pacific routes (Armijos Samaniego & Medina, 2020). These sub‑regional mechanisms allow smaller states to pool limited resources and share operational information.
Third, Ecuador sought to involve extra‑regional partners. The European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ecuador in 2023 to strengthen cooperation against organised crime. In 2025, the EU and Ecuador launched the SERPAZ programme (Security, Peace and Institutional Strengthening), which focuses on port control, cybersecurity, and social prevention of violence. This illustrates how a small state can leverage its own security crisis to attract technical and financial assistance from developed partners.
A separate but related challenge has been migration. The influx of Venezuelan migrants – around half a million people transiting or settling in Ecuador – placed additional pressure on public services and generated security concerns in some localities. In response, Ecuador initiated the Quito Process, a regional coordination mechanism that brought together Latin American countries to discuss burden‑sharing and financial support from international donors. This initiative demonstrates how migration, while a domestic challenge, can serve as a platform for multilateral diplomacy.
3. Ecuador’s Engagement with International Organisations
Between 2023 and 2024, Ecuador held a non‑permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This was only the second time in the country’s history (the first being 1991–1992). During its term, Ecuador focused on three thematic priorities: the peaceful settlement of disputes, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and the fight against illicit arms trafficking (Carranco‑Paredes & Moncayo, 2025). The membership strengthened Ecuador’s international profile and provided opportunities to highlight the link between organised crime and global security.
However, Ecuador’s relationship with international organisations has also been tested. In April 2024, a diplomatic crisis erupted when Ecuadorian security forces entered the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas, who had been granted political asylum by Mexico. The operation was condemned by the UN Secretary‑General, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Mexico severed diplomatic relations and took the case to the International Court of Justice.
This incident reveals an important tension. On the one hand, Ecuador had previously received expressions of support from the OAS for its broader fight against organised crime (OAS Permanent Council Declaration No. 82, January 2024). On the other hand, the same organisations insisted on the inviolability of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention. For a small state, participation in international institutions thus entails both resource and legitimacy benefits and legal constraints. The incident did not, however, lead to a lasting isolation of Ecuador; functional cooperation in security matters with most regional partners continued.
Regarding regional integration, Ecuador has adopted a flexible approach. After withdrawing from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2019, it joined the more ideologically diverse PROSUR. More importantly, Ecuador remained active in the Andean Community (CAN). In January 2024, CAN member states established the Andean Security Network for real‑time intelligence exchange on organised crime. This initiative shows that practical security cooperation can proceed even when grand regional projects stall.
Finally, Ecuador continues to cooperate with INTERPOL in operations against smuggling, human trafficking, and illicit firearms. Engagement with financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also been necessary to secure budgetary support for security spending, illustrating the interconnectedness of economic and security dimensions.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the evolution of security issues in Ecuador’s foreign policy between 2017 and 2025. The analysis leads to several conclusions.
First, Ecuador’s foreign policy during this period has become increasingly securitised. The dramatic rise in violence linked to drug trafficking shifted organised crime from a matter of domestic policing to an existential threat to the state. This perception was formally codified in the declaration of an internal armed conflict in January 2024, which legitimised a more active role for the armed forces and opened the door to deeper security cooperation with external partners.
Second, Ecuador’s strategic behaviour can be described as functional differentiation or pragmatic multi‑orientation. While the country has moved significantly closer to the United States in the security domain – including the SOFA agreement and enhanced counter‑narcotics cooperation – it has not abandoned economic ties with China. The free trade agreement with Beijing, ratified under President Noboa, confirms that economic pragmatism remains a distinct pillar of Ecuador’s external relations. This pattern is consistent with small state theory, which predicts that limited resources and vulnerability encourage hedging or issue‑specific alignment rather than full bandwagoning.
Third, participation in international organisations has been a double‑edged sword for Ecuador. The UN Security Council membership raised the country’s profile and allowed it to advocate for its security priorities. However, the diplomatic crisis with Mexico demonstrated that international law and regional norms constrain small states even when they act in the name of domestic security. Maintaining constructive relationships within the OAS, CELAC, and the Andean Community remains essential for Ecuador to mobilise external support and avoid isolation.
Fourth, the Ecuadorian case illustrates the adaptability of small states in the face of non‑traditional threats. Through bilateral agreements, sub‑regional networks (Andean Security Network, maritime cooperation with Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama), and partnerships with the EU and the United States, Ecuador has sought to compensate for its own resource limitations. The effectiveness of these measures in reducing violence over the long term remains to be seen, but the foreign policy response has been proactive and multi‑layered.
In conclusion, Ecuador’s foreign policy from 2017 to 2025 reflects the challenges of a small state navigating a dangerous neighbourhood. The prioritisation of security has led to a pragmatic realignment with the United States, while economic relations with China continue. International organisations provide both support and scrutiny. Future research should examine the long‑term sustainability of this securitised foreign policy and its implications for Ecuador’s democracy and human rights record.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank colleagues from the Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology, and Innovation (in Spanish SENESCYT) and National Information System of Higher Education of Ecuador (in Spanish SNIESE).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
